

SECRET

25X1

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #1973-79/1

18 April 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 17 April with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they have significant additional concerns, I will report further to you.


William Parmenter

Attachment
NFAC #1973-79

DIA review completed.

25X1

SECRET

NFAC #1073-79/1

18 April 1979

SUBJECT: Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

ATTACHMENT: NFAC #1073-79

Distribution:

Original - DCI (w/att)
1 - DDCI "
1 - DD/NFA "
1 - ER "
1 - NIO/W "
1 - NIO/AF "
1 - NFAC/RI "

SECRET

25X1

18 April 1979
NFAC #1973-79

WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 6

USSR

New Soviet policy departures in southern Africa do not appear in prospect; the analysts feel that events in this region still appear to be moving in a satisfactory direction from Moscow's standpoint. The Horn region, however, is regarded increasingly as a "special case" which will bear close watching. There are some signs that the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship may in coming months take on a dimension that has been largely (though not completely) speculative heretofore: broader and more serious Soviet encouragement to the Ethiopians to become an "African Cuba," in the sense that Ethiopian forces become available for political-military action elsewhere on the continent.

CUBA

It is now clear that Cuban forces in Ethiopia are being rotated rather than drawn down. In southern Africa, analysts expect modest increments of assistance to the liberation movements, with the object of keeping them viable under Rhodesian and South African pressures. Basically, we still believe that what the Cubans (and Soviets) send to this region depends on what the regional leaders, especially Kaunda in Zambia, ask for. We note that the reported request from Mozambique for Cuban help on a larger scale has never been confirmed from the Mozambique side of the equation.

SOUTH AFRICA

Noting the political atmosphere in South Africa, analysts are now concerned that preparations for a nuclear weapons test may be started up again (assuming that the period of dormancy at the Kalahari facility has in fact signalled that the test program was put into "neutral" in the fall of 1977). If a device is tested in coming months, they suspect that a choice of site might be influenced by political considerations; using Kalahari would be another act of defiance of US and world opinion. Moreover, they feel that a test would have far-reaching, though not now

* This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

definable, political consequences over the whole range of South African relationships, regionally and abroad.

Our concern over nuclear matters arises in the context of a belief that South African policy is becoming more assertive across the board -- not just on Rhodesia and Namibia. The food situation in the region is such, for example, as to permit an aggressive food diplomacy by the South Africans, aimed against Zambia and other targets. A tougher line toward Mozambique, not to mention Angola, may also be in the offing.

At the same time, some analysts point out that much of current South African politico-strategic thinking centers on hope that a conservative trend will modify, or even sweep aside, the policies of current governments in the UK and the US. These analysts argue that even in their tougher posture, the South Africans will not want to make it impossible for future, more congenial, governments in Washington and London to do business with them.

RHODESIA

[Community analysts' current views on future developments in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe are the subject of a special report being drafted for circulation in early May.]

We are concerned that action by the US Congress to lift sanctions would produce hostile demonstrations against the US in Zambia, Nigeria, and elsewhere in Africa. We are also concerned that the possibility of a three-front war, involving Botswana as well as Zambia and Mozambique, is growing again as a result of the flow of refugees and recruits into Botswana from Rhodesia, the inability of the guerrilla organizations to move them rapidly out of Botswana to Zambia, and the more aggressive tactics of the Rhodesians against targets in Botswana. There is at the same time some chance, ironically, that more direct South African involvement with Rhodesia's military planning might lead to some restraints on Rhodesian actions which had adverse political consequences or which seemed to over-extend the South Africans.

NAMIBIA

A collapse of negotiations appears even more likely with the consequences analysts pointed toward last month. We are especially concerned about the possibility of escalation along the Namibia-Angola border; we wonder how much longer the Cubans will in effect avoid clashing directly with the South Africans as the latter pursue SWAPO.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ZAMBIA

We have an impression that the situation in Zambia is still "deteriorating," but we are not able to reach serious conclusions as to the political impact of the situation on Kaunda's position. The fact is that we have no way of gauging how long Zambia's political and social structure can survive unscathed the continuing decay in economic and security services, broadly defined.

ZAIRE

We are still concerned that the situation will deteriorate after 30 June, when the IAF is supposedly to depart. State analysts in particular point out, however, that one should not assume that all will be well until 30 June. There is not only the possibility that student demonstrations may resume on Mobutu's return to the country from his current tour, but that some fresh upheaval in Shaba, taking other forms than invasion from outside, could occur at virtually any time.

UGANDA

With the Tanzanians reportedly prepared to spend at least three months' worth of military occupation in getting the new government on its feet, our worries point to the period after the Tanzanian withdrawal, whenever that occurs. We have no new thoughts on this, just the same old picture of ethnic conflicts and the confusions likely to be introduced by the hopes and fears of neighboring governments.

SUDAN

Nimeiry's problems, which are well known to you, will not soon go away even though they may be alleviated temporarily by Saudi or other foreign assistance. The Eritrean problem, moreover, is still there, and a new Ethiopian offensive appears about to start; this is likely to increase the refugee flow and again bring the Ethiopians closer to the Sudan border.

LIBERIA

Analysts believe it is too soon for a serious assessment of the political and psychological damage from the riots of last weekend. There is a potential for increased friction with the US, as the government seeks both US help and domestic measures which might affect American business interests. So far, we have seen no network of opposition elements, such as existed in Iran, but we will be watching for this development

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

MAURITANIA

One effect of the recent shift in leadership in Mauritania -- in effect a "coup" by what appear to be pro-Moroccan elements -- could be to make the Polisario rebels more actively hostile; the previous government had sought some accommodation with them.

SEYCHELLES

DIA analysts note signs of a possible increase in Soviet interest and presence, possibly taking advantage of the present government's nervousness over the activities of its ousted opponents. There appears to DIA to be some pattern in the arrival of Soviet athletic coaches, a Soviet cruiser on visit, and Malagasy troops to assist with security (the Malagasy government leans left).

NIGERIA

Election dates have now been set for the period 7 July through 11 August (this includes the first weeks of Ramadan), and the real test of the government's ability to carry through to civilian rule in the fall now has a calendar focus. Both political violence and criminal violence appear to be on the rise; again, we have little way of knowing in advance how much the society can take before someone, most probably in the military, decides on radical surgery.

CAPE VERDE

We reported last fall concerns over increasing Soviet influence or presence, and our view that President Pereira stood in the way. Pereira has now moved against the pro-Soviet faction, but we are not clear that they have been neutralized rather than alarmed. We worry that the left radicals may strike back, and the Soviets achieve a net gain in the end.

LOCUST

The locust threat in East Africa, previously reported elsewhere, now focuses on Sudan and immediately adjacent areas. As before, the problem is unusually serious because of favorable weather (for locusts) in the breeding areas, and the interruption of anti-locust activity by the Ogaden fighting.

SECRET